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The G20 under Argentina’s Presidency: 
Time to Deliver on the Hamburg Promises
GIGA Focus | Global | Number 6 | December 2017 | ISSN 1862-3581
On 1 December 2017, Argentina took over the presidency of the G20 from the 
German government. This is the right time to briefly review the year of the G20 
under a German presidency in troubled times. It is also a prudent time to look 
ahead and provide a preliminary assessment of the priorities set by Argentina. 
 • The G20 under the German presidency has displayed flexibility, avoided dead-
lock, and – despite the protests – started to address its legitimacy problems. 
The Hamburg summit recognised that the gains of globalisation have not been 
shared widely enough, and 19 members of the G20 reaffirmed their commit-
ment to the Paris Agreement. Yet, the summit did not deliver concrete actions.
 • The Argentine presidency will have to keep the G20 alive and functioning, but 
the club will also have to demonstrate that the commitment to “shape globaliza-
tion to benefit all people” does not turn out to be an empty promise. 
 • The Argentine government has set three priority issues for its G20 presidency: 
the future of work, infrastructure for development, and food security – topics 
on which some consensus is likely to be found. The proposal stresses the need 
for greater involvement of the private sector, particularly in terms of financing 
infrastructure. 
 • The G20 summit in Buenos Aires risks becoming a lost opportunity. The cur-
rent Argentine proposal for the agenda is not ambitious enough, and it sends 
the wrong signals. Instead of managing adjustment, it overemphasises the need 
to enable people to adjust. Further, too much emphasis is placed on increased 
private-sector involvement – be it in infrastructure or agriculture. 
 • The summit in Buenos Aires presents an opportunity to start considering the 
concrete steps to achieving more inclusive growth through a fairer globalisa-
tion. The solution cannot be to turn yet more public assets into private ones. 
Policy Implications
“Inclusive growth” and a “fair globalisation” can still be mainstreamed into the 
agenda of Buenos Aires. Measures to ensure that the benefits of further globalisa-
tion and technological progress are more equitably distributed include progres-
sive tax and transfer systems that will have to more effectively tackle the chal-
lenge of increasing wealth inequality. The G20 would be the appropriate format 
to push these policies forward. 
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The G20 under the German Presidency:  
A Diplomatic Success …
Most observers judge the “performance” of the G20 under the German presidency 
as successful. Narlikar (2017), for example, considers the G20 summit of 2017 a 
landmark moment, as it was able to reach a joint declaration in a time of a backlash 
against globalisation. From this perspective, the joint declaration can be considered 
a major achievement mainly because a consensus was reached that recognises that 
economic growth needs to become more inclusive and that the gains of globalisa-
tion have to be shared more widely. Further, the response to the US administra-
tion’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement – the 19 other G20 members acknow­
ledging the US decision while reaffirming their own and the group’s commitment to 
the agreement – was probably the best option for a diplomatic work­around, and it 
helped preclude the summit’s failure. 
The G20 was able to avoid deadlock in Hamburg, and I would thus tend to side 
with the above optimistic interpretation of the summit in terms of its diplomatic 
success. As is obvious from the above account, one’s judgement of the G20 in 2017 
is also a matter of a counterfactual: the forms that alternative scenarios might have 
taken. It is not unthinkable that a Leaders’ Declaration – with all its annexes – 
might not have been agreed upon. Further, it is also conceivable that other coun-
tries might have used the US positions on trade and climate to challenge previous 
consensus views and international agreements in order to cater to domestic politics 
or for other tactical and strategic purposes. 
The main reason for the G20’s diplomatic success in Hamburg was its flexi­
bility, a quality  that was particularly important in 2017 and is likely to remain so 
under the Argentine presidency. The Hamburg summit – and its prior work in the 
working groups and ministerial meetings – provided a testing ground for interna-
tional cooperation with a largely unpredictable US administration. The G20’s con-
stitution as an informal process has allowed the group to fulfil that function and, in 
this sense, the G20 has played an important complementary role to the UN, other 
international organisations, and further treaties that are being undermined by the 
US administration. Although a further weakening of international organisations is a 
real risk, this risk did not originate within the G20. Instead, the working groups are 
an important vehicle for a number of international organisations to bring aware-
ness of their work to government officials who would otherwise be more concerned 
with domestic matters. 
It has been pointed out by various observers (Narlikar 2017; Berger 2017) that 
the G20 first started to address its legitimacy problems under the German presiden-
cy. Though the protests in Hamburg suggest otherwise, the G20 made an explicit 
attempt to engage more seriously with diverse stakeholders in the run­up to the 
summit. In particular, the German government has supported and actively taken 
part in the so­called “engagement groups” of the G20 – for example, the C20 (civil 
society organisations), the T20 (think tanks), and the L20 (labour groups and trade 
unions). 
In 2017, the G20 proved a relatively robust process capable of maintaining a 
certain level of international cooperation. Keeping this process alive and function-
ing will be one of the main tasks of the Argentine presidency. 
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… But Progress on Key Issues Was (Very) Limited
Unfortunately, the current level of cooperation between the G20 members is insuf-
ficient to address the urgent global problems the world faces, in particular climate 
change and a renegotiation of the terms of globalisation. The G20 has thus main-
tained and even augmented its diplomatic importance, but in terms of substance 
much remains to be delivered. This is not to downplay the importance of the G20 as 
a process. It is also not to say that substantial progress would have been politically 
feasible in 2017. Yet, it is necessary to say that progress on two key global challenges 
is insufficient. 
First, clearly and without doubt, progress remains insufficient with regard to 
climate change. This is not only because of the position of the US administration. 
It is also because the reaffirmation of the commitment to the Paris Agreement by 
19 member countries does not suffice. Effective progress on nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs) (and beyond) is required, and domestic actions must be taken 
accordingly. Because of the importance of domestic actions for the Paris Agreement, 
the loose G20 club is a good place to coordinate and leverage progress in individual 
G20 member states, which are responsible for the lion’s share of worldwide emis-
sions, even without the United States. Coordination among the G20 would thus help 
overcome the coordination problem that is inherent to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the Leaders’ Declaration 
promises to move “swiftly towards its [the Paris Agreement’s] full implementation,” 
the agreed­upon G20 Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth, [1] to 
which the United States has made its position clear, contains hardly any concrete 
actions. It is particularly unsatisfactory that the Hamburg summit was not able to 
move forward in setting a timeline to phase out fossil fuel subsidies (Hansen 2017).
Second, it has been argued that a major achievement of the Hamburg summit 
was the recognition that globalisation “has created challenges and its benefits have 
not been shared widely enough” and, consequently, that globalisation needs “to be 
shaped to benefit all people” (G20 Leaders’ Declaration). [2] It is remarkable that it 
took until 2017 for the world’s leaders to collectively realise this key challenge of our 
times. For example, it has long been known that real US wages have been stagnant 
since the 1970s despite considerable economic growth. Further, numerous studies 
have shown that liberalisation and opening­up of economies creates winners and 
losers and can have adverse distributional implications in developing country con-
texts as well. The problem is not only that the benefits have not been shared widely 
enough; the gains have often accrued to those who were better off already, while the 
losers tend to be those with little capacity to adjust – meaning, again, not the richer 
segments of the population. There is thus a link between the rising inequality and 
globalisation – and the interrelated accelerated speed of technological change that 
has accompanied it – that is not sufficiently acknowledged in the declaration. The 
necessary debate and exchange about policies for a “fairer” globalisation should 
therefore explicitly address within­country inequalities and go beyond a discussion 
of mitigating adjustment costs. [3] In terms of concrete actions for a more inclusive 
globalisation, Hamburg had little to offer. But maybe more is to be expected from 
Buenos Aires?
1 All G20 documents and 
declarations can be found 
under Bundesregierung 
(2017).
2 See, for example 
Narlikar (2017) and Snower 
(2017).
3 The G20 Leaders’ 
Declaration states that the 
G20 member states agree 
to “exchange experiences 
on the mitigation of the 
adjustment costs of trade 
and investment liberaliza-
tion and technological 
change, and on appropri-
ate domestic policies.”
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Argentina’s Priorities 
Neither trade nor climate change are among the priorities of the Argentine govern-
ment for the summit in Buenos Aires. Instead, President Macri proposed the fol-
lowing priorities for the G20’s agenda in 2018: (1) the future of work and what this 
implies for education, (2) infrastructure for development, and (3) food security (see 
G20 Argentina website 2017). These priorities are more topical and concrete than 
the more comprehensive agenda of the German presidency, “building resilience, 
improving sustainability, and assuming responsibility.” Further, the Argentine gov-
ernment has emphasised that it does not see itself representing only a single coun-
try, but the entire region of Latin America. 
The Future of Work
With regard to the future of work, Macri specified that “adopting technological ad-
vances” should “not lead to economic exclusion or other negative side effects” and 
that this requires investment in training and skills. Many expect digitalisation, after 
globalisation, to send the next wave of economic shocks through the world’s labour 
markets. A T20 policy brief (Frey 2017) entitled The Future of Jobs and Growth: 
Making the Digital Revolution Work for the Many stresses the importance of en-
ab ling workers through training – in line with Macri’s statement – in combination 
with measures to facilitate job reallocation. More flexible occupational licensing 
requirements and “relocation vouchers” would help workers move to regions where 
digitalisation is creating new jobs. The role of the G20 could be to act as a platform 
to share policy experiences and best practices.
Enabling people to adjust to new workplaces is easier said than done if the 
basis for acquiring “adjustment skills,” in particular a solid secondary education, 
is weak. [4] As illustrated for selected middle-income G20 countries and the aver-
age OECD country in Figure 1 below, the educational basis in reading/writing and 
maths, on which these skills would have to build, differs vastly across G20 coun-
tries. China today shows educational achievement close to or (in maths) even higher 
than the OECD average. The country thus clearly outperforms those of its Latin 
American G20 peers with similar levels of income per capita: Brazil and Mexico. 
Note that the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) stud-
ies aim to assess “the extent to which 15­year­old students, near the end of their 
compulsory education, have acquired key knowledge and skills that are essential for 
full participation in modern societies.” While PISA tests knowledge reproduction, 
it also examines how well students can apply acquired knowledge to unfamiliar set-
tings, both in and outside of school. It is obvious that these “transfer skills” will be 
decisive for the success of the training measures intended to facilitate adjustment. 
What is almost more worrying than the low average levels of educational 
achievement in some G20 member states is the very high inequality of educational 
outcomes, illustrated here by the share of students that lack fundamental skills in 
maths and reading and writing. In Brazil and Indonesia, more than 50 per cent of 
15­year­old students demonstrate deficiency in reading/writing skills (60 per cent 
in maths). This compares to a roughly one­fifth of students with these deficits in 
 
4 This was also acknow-
ledged in Macri’s speech 
(G20 Argentina website 
2017). 
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the OECD countries on average. The G20 host country, Argentina (here, results are 
available only for Buenos Aires), performs relatively well. 
These PISA results are indicative of the high risk that many people in G20 countries 
will be left behind by digitalisation. There is an urgent need to better prepare the 
young for the digital age, in particular in middle­income countries with high levels 
of inequality in income and education. Educational inequality is of course closely 
related to inequalities in resources and income, so policies to tackle income and 
wealth inequality are relevant to educational inequality – and vice versa.
Finally, while the focus on enabling people to adjust is right, there are likely 
to be limits to people’s adjustment capacity – even if they are better­trained and 
endowed with reallocation vouchers. Although politicians find it more attractive to 
manage growth, the equally important aspect of adjustment policies entails man-
aging decline. This may include temporary subsidies and structural policies that 
mitigate the adverse effects of technological change on those with limited capacity 
to be retrained and relocated. 
Infrastructure for Development
In the second priority, “infrastructure for development,” the Argentine presidency 
stresses the need to fill the gap in infrastructure investment in many G20 member 
states. Its main proposal to achieve this is to mobilise private capital by establish-
ing infrastructure as an asset class (G20 Argentina website 2017). This proposal 
builds on and extends the agreement reached at the Hamburg summit in which 
the G20 endorsed the “Hamburg Principles and Ambitions” on boosting the role of 
Figure 1 
Selected PISA Results 
of Selected G20 Coun-
tries vis-à-vis the 
OECD Average
Source: Author’s own 
compilation using data 
from www.oecd.org/
pisa/data/.
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private finance. This common framework allows us to quantify the ability of multi-
lateral development banks to secure private funds, and the G20 agreed to a target 
of increasing mobilisation by 25 to 35 per cent over the next three years (Bundes­
regierung 2017). 
It is true that the G20, in its finance track, would be the appropriate forum to 
discuss ways to more effectively mobilise international private finance for infra-
structure investment. However, it should not be ignored that turning – typically 
publicly owned – infrastructure into an “asset class” held by private investors im-
plies yet more privatisation of state­owned assets. This may not be desirable, as it 
may further fuel inequality. The large­scale privatisations of the 1990s and 2000s 
have been found to be an important driver of increasing wealth inequality through-
out the world (Word Inequality Report 2017).
It may sound repetitive to those who have been following the policy discussion 
surrounding the Hamburg summit, but instead of emphasising the need for the mo-
bilisation of private capital, the G20 should focus on strengthening and reorienting 
investment strategies “to exploit the significant opportunities of low­carbon, cli-
mate­resilient infrastructure” (Bak et al. 2017). In addition, it is with regard to in-
frastructure investment where the G20 has major stakes and influence in non­G20 
member countries. Think of the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” strategy, or indeed 
the G20’s “Compact with Africa” initiative, which illustrates how the G20 can pro-
vide a platform for increased cooperation and coordination. Continued attention 
of the G20 to the Compact with Africa under the Argentine presidency would also 
keep up the momentum of the G20’s partnership with Africa, which may otherwise 
lose impetus in 2018.
Food Security
The third priority theme of the Argentine presidency, food security, is not at all a 
new issue to the G20. Previous summits have dealt with food security, starting with 
the Food Security and Nutrition Framework in 2014 under the Australian presiden-
cy, continuing with the Food Security Action Plan in Antalya in 2015, and a proposal 
on good practices on family farming and smallholder agriculture in Hangzhou in 
2016 (see Bundesregierung 2017, for the documents; Gulati, Kharas, and von Braun 
2017). To that list, Hamburg has added the G20 Initiative for Rural Youth Em-
ployment. It is understood that the challenge of food security requires (a) increas-
ing agri cultural productivity and closing productivity gaps, also in light of climate 
change, (b) paying particular attention to family farming and rural off-farm em-
ployment, especially for the youth, and (c) reducing vulnerability to temporary loss 
of food security (G20 Initiative for Rural Youth Employment at Bundesregierung 
2017; Gulati, Kharas, and von Braun 2017).
This said, it remains to be seen where exactly Argentina sees (or wants to see) 
the debate on food security moving. In his opening speech, Macri pointed out that 
“agricultural lands are the natural resource that produces most of our food, but they 
are limited and non­renewable. Their preservation is crucial. This is where the G20 
can lay the groundwork for more public–private partnership.” It is not obvious why 
the issue of land preservation is linked to the need for more public–private partner-
ships. In fact, the G20 Initiative for Rural Youth Employment “acknowledges that 
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an increase is needed in responsible public- and private-sector investments and 
financing for responsible private­sector investments to support dynamic economies 
that deliver services, facilitate decent work and generate business opportunities and 
income for the next generation.” The double use of “responsible” in combination 
with a strong emphasis of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
(VGGT) and the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food 
Systems (CFS­RAI) is not typical for a G20 document and reflects the concerns 
that have been raised by many regarding the sustainability and socio-economic im-
pacts of large-scale agricultural investment in recent years (Nolte, Chamberlain, 
and Giger 2016).
Inequality: The Missing Link
It may indeed not have been the cleverest strategy to put the potentially divisive 
themes of climate and trade at the top of the agenda for Buenos Aires. Given the 
above assessment, it is apparent that the summit will be able to produce some con-
sensus on the priorities chosen by Argentina – maybe even along the suggested 
lines: for example, in terms of more private involvement in financing infrastructure. 
However, if the Hamburg summit really marked an important shift in the G20’s 
thinking, including “a widespread recognition that the nations of the world as a 
whole must make progress in stopping climate change and in overcoming inequali-
ties and pockets of poverty” (Snower 2017), too little of this recognition can be seen 
in the Argentine agenda as of now. 
The summit in Buenos Aires presents an opportunity to start thinking about 
what concrete steps such recognition would imply. And it is obvious that the solu-
tion cannot be found in turning yet more public assets into private ones. Putting 
inequality – or, if you like, “inclusive growth” –  on the agenda would have helped. 
However, it is also a topic that can (still) be mainstreamed into the Argentine pri-
orities – for example, by addressing the inequalities in educational opportunities, 
and linking the issues of investments in infrastructure and agriculture to inclusive 
growth. 
Reducing inequality should be a cross-cutting theme of the G20 – in Buenos 
Aires and beyond – as it is very closely linked to both the impacts of digitalisation 
on labour markets and the debates about a fairer globalisation. In fact, it seems to 
be often overlooked that these two debates have much in common and are closely 
interrelated. Much can be learnt from the labour market impacts of globalisation 
and the policies that have or have not worked (or should have been in place). For 
example, in particular in the United States, economic decline in some regions has 
not been well managed. And recent evidence from developing countries also hints 
at long­lasting negative effects of adjustment on inequality.
Further, the speed with which digitalisation is spreading and how it affects 
worldwide patterns of production and, eventually, labour markets will be deter-
mined to a large extent by the international trade and investment regime. Thus, 
fairer global trade governance will have to address these future structuring ele-
ments of the world economy, in particular trade in “digital services.” Finding the 
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right policies and the right modalities of openness to achieve a more inclusive pat-
tern of economic growth will not be an easy task.
So far, the connections between trade, digitalisation, and equity have not mani-
fested meaningfully in the G20’s declarations. Yet, the Hamburg Action Plan con-
tains a list of domestic policy measures meant to promote inclusive growth. This list 
includes youth employment and entrepreneurship programmes, transfers to vari-
ous disadvantaged groups, reducing or waiving school fees for poorer households, 
and programmes aimed at financial inclusion. While many of these programmes 
are probably good to have, we must ask when the following issues will come into 
play: the effectiveness of tax systems to reduce income inequality; universal social 
security; progressive taxation; and wealth and property taxation. It is remarkable 
that not a single G20 country has mentioned such actions. 
If there is agreement that inequality is a problem, then it is hard to understand why 
the G20 continues to shy away from even mentioning redistribution and progres-
sive taxation in the context of inclusive growth. There are plenty of experiences that 
can be discussed and shared. Consider, for example, the large variation in market­
income inequality and in the extent of redistribution through taxes and transfers. 
Figure 2 (taken from the IMF’s report Tackling Inequality) compares market-in-
come inequality with inequality in disposable income after taxes and transfers, il-
lustrating that many Latin American countries, including G20 member Brazil, are 
not able (or willing) to reduce their high income inequality through taxes and trans-
fers. The average reduction of the Gini coefficient in the (limited) sample of Latin 
American countries is only 0.03, which compares to 0.17 in the sample of advanced 
economies. As the only Latin American country whose tax and transfer system is 
effectively bringing down income inequality, this year’s G20 host is a notable ex-
ception.  
Concluding Remarks
The G20 summit in Buenos Aires may turn into a lost opportunity. It may make 
diplomatic sense to put priorities on the agenda in which some consensus is likely 
to be achieved. Regardless of whether or not they are Argentine priorities, the issues 
of global trade and investment as well as climate change will be discussed at the 
summit. Domestic Argentine politics may partly explain why Macri’s government 
Figure 2 
Redistributive Impact 
of Income Taxes and 
Transfers, 2015 or 
Latest Year
Note the typo on the 
x-axis, which should go 
up to 0.7. 
Source: IMF 2017: 
Figure 1.12.
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does not want to shine as the country in Latin America that performs best in terms 
of income redistribution. However, the current Argentine proposal for the agenda 
is not ambitious enough and sends the wrong signals. 
Unlike the Hamburg summit, Buenos Aires will not be termed a success just be-
cause it does not completely fail. Taming Mr. Trump will not suffice. The Argentine 
presidency will have to keep the G20 alive and functioning, but the G20 will also 
have to demonstrate that the Hamburg statement to “shape globalization to benefit 
all people” was not an empty promise. Enabling people to adjust and to reap the 
benefits of globalisation – and of technological progress – is important to achieving 
this, but so is the reduction of inequality. 
Inequality that threatens the stability of democracy in the richer G20 countries 
and seriously harms the prospects of economic progress in middle-income coun-
tries needs to be addressed. The G20 has seemed so far to assume that inequality is 
very much about improving the lot of the marginalised. While this is an important 
aspect of inequality, it is often overlooked that the rise in inequality, in particular 
wealth inequality, is driven by fundamental mechanisms of the current economic 
model and related to key issues that are discussed in the framework of the G20, be 
they globalisation, digitalisation, or public investment.
It is particularly with regard to infrastructure (and investment in agriculture) 
where the Argentine presidency is sending the wrong signals by emphasising the 
need to mobilise more private capital. Infrastructure can also be funded by increas-
ing public revenues – for example, by making tax systems more progressive. In gen-
eral, strengthening the role of the private sector may be desirable from an efficiency 
point of view, but – as highlighted by the recent report on inequality – it may well 
have adverse effects on the distribution of income. Further, in light of the mixed 
evidence on the success of public–private partnerships (Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2013), this emphasis also seems to be misplaced. This is not to demonise the 
role of the private sector. I have argued elsewhere (Lay 2017) that public investment 
can be used to leverage private investment and have welcomed, in principle, the 
idea of the Compact with Africa, which I would like to see receive continued atten-
tion under the Argentine presidency.
Finally, the benefits of further globalisation and technological progress can be 
more equitably distributed if these processes are managed with an explicit con-
sideration of equity objectives. Measures to achieve inclusive growth will have to 
include progressive tax and transfer systems that will have to tackle the challenge 
of increasing wealth inequality more effectively. The G20 would be the right place 
to advance this.
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Related GIGA Research
The GIGA conducted research and organised several events on the G20 process 
during the German G20 presidency, including a series of Focus issues on various 
topics related to the summit, such as the G20’s possible role in “saving” globaliza-
tion, along with regional insights from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle 
East. These papers addressed a host of issues ranging from the working conditions 
of women, corruption, and tax reform, to the challenges of social development. In 
addition, the GIGA’s Research Programme 3 “Growth and Development” investi-
gates inclusive patterns of economic development and questions of sustainability. 
This includes, for example, the GIGA’s research on labour markets, climate­change 
mitigation, and economic development, and its examination of the expansion of 
commercial agriculture in developing countries. 
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